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Introduction
In [4], the authors give two public key encryptions based on third order linear
sequences modulo n2, where n = pq is an RSA integer. In their scheme (3), there
are two mistakes in the decryption procedure:
(1) The owner of the private key does not know the value of m such that
C1 = sm(a, b) and C2 = s−m(a, b), and thus he/she can not compute
L(C1, C2).
(2) If sλ(a, b) = 3 modulo n
2, then L(a, b) is not invertible modulo n. It follows
that the owner of the private key can not decrypt the cipher C = (C1, C2)
since he/she can not compute L(C1,C2)L(a,b) .
In this short note, in order to decrypt the ciphertext C = (C1, C2), another map L
similar to that given in [4] is constructed. More precisely, if L(a, b) is not invertible
modulo n, we describe a method how to choose (a, b) such that L(a, b) is invertible
modulo n and how to compute L(C1, C2).
1. Third order Linear sequences
Let p be an odd prime integer, (a, b) ∈ ZZ2 and s(a, b) be a the third linear
order sequence defined by sk+3(a, b) = ask+2(a, b) − bsk+1(a, b) + sk(a, b) ( (a, b)
is called the generator of s(a, b) and k is the exponent). Let α1, α2 and α3 be the
complex roots of f(X). Then there exists (a1, a2, a3) ∈ IQ
3 such that for every k ∈ z,
sk(a, b) = a1α
k
1+a2α
k
2+a3α
k
3 . Note that the tuple (a1, a2, a3) depends on the choice
of s2(a, b), s0(a, b) and s1(a, b). For (a1, a2, a3) ∈ ZZ
3 such that a1 = a2 = a3 = 1 [p]
(modulo p), we have s0(a, b) = 3, s1(a, b) = a and s−1(a, b) = b modulo p.
In the following, we assume that a1 = a2 = a3 = 1 [p]. Denote TK/IQ and NK/IQ
the trace and norm maps of K. Then sk(a, b) = TK/IQ(α
k
1) [p] and for every i,
NK/IQ(αi) = (αi)
p2+p+1
= 1 [p]. Thus, p2 + p+ 1 is a period of s(a, b) modulo p.
The following cryptographic applications of LFSR sequences are listed in [7, 5].
We present them without proof.
(1) For every k ∈ ZZ, let fk(X) = X
3 − sk(a, b)X
2 + s
−k(a, b)X − 1 [p]. Then
fk(X) = (X − α
k
1)(X − α
k
2)(X − α
k
3) [p].
(2) In particular, for every k and e, se(sk(a, b), s−k(a, b)) = ske(a, b) [p].
Partially supported by ERCIM.
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2. Clarification remarks considering [4]
In this section, in order to decrypt a cipher C = (C1, C2) as given in [4, Sec.3
and 4], let n = pq be an RSA, (a, b) ∈ IN2 such that f(X) = X3 − aX2 + bX − 1
is irreducible modulo p (resp. modulo q). Let sk(a, b) be the third order linear
sequence modulo n2 generated by (a, b) such that s0(a, b) = 3, s1(a, b) = a and
s
−1(a, b) = b modulo n.
In order to have sλ(a,b)−3n [n] invertible, if sλ(a, b) 6= 3 [n
2], then we will keep
s0(a, b) = 3, s1(a, b) = a and s−1(a, b) = b modulo n
2. If sλ(a, b) = 3 [n
2],
then let A = a + n, β1, β2 and β3 the roots of g(X) = X
3 − AX2 + bX − 1.
Let s(A, b) be the characteristic sequence generated by A and b modulo n2 :{
sk+3(A, b) = Ask+2(A, b)− bsk+1(A, b) + sk(A, b) [n
2]
s0(A, b) = 3, s1(A, b) = A, s−1(A, b) = b [n
2]
Since f¯(X) = g¯(X) [n], then up to a permutation for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, there exists
ti ∈ IC such that βi = αi + nti. Thus, for every integer k, sk(A, b) =
∑3
i=1 β
k
i =∑3
i=1(αi + nti)
k =
∑3
i=1(α
k
i + nkti) = sk(a, b) + nk(t1 + t2 + t3) modulo [n
2]. For
k = 1, we have t1 + t2 + t3 = 1 [n]. Thus, sλ(A, b) = sλ(a, b) + nλ [n
2], and then
sλ(A,b)−3
n = λ [n] is invertible. Finally, without loss of generality, up to replace a
by a+ n, we can assume that sλ(a,b)−3n is invertible modulo n, where λ is the least
common multiple of (p2 + p+ 1, q2 + q + 1).
Proposition 1. (1) For every k ∈ ZZ, let fk(X) = X
3−sk(a, b)X
2+s
−k(a, b)X−
1 [n2]. Then fk(X) = (X − α
k
1)(X − α
k
2)(X − α
k
3) [n
2].
(2) In particular, for every k and e, se(sk(a, b), s−k(a, b)) = ske(a, b) [n
2].
Proof. Since sk(a, b) =
∑3
i=1 α
k
i [n
2], αk1α
k
2α
k
3 = 1 [n
2] and αk1α
k
2 + α
k
1α
k
3 +
αk2α
k
3 = α
−k
1 + α
−k
2 + α
−k
3 [n
2].
Let Γ = {(x, y) ∈ ZZ2, sλ(x, y) = 3 [n]} and L : Γ −→
Z
nZ be the map defined
by L(x, y) = sλ(x,y)−3n [n]. Since sλ(x, y) = 3 [n], then L is well defined.
Proposition 2. For every integer k,
L(sk(a,b),s−k(a,b))
L(a,b) = k [n].
Proof. First, L(a, b) = sλ(a,b)−3n is invertible modulo n. Let Γ
i
1 = {x ∈
Z [αi]
n2Z [αi]
, x = 1 [n]} and Li : Γi1 −→
Z [αi]
nZ [αi]
be the map defined by Li(x) = x−1n [n].
Then for every (x, y) ∈ (Γi1)
2, Li(xy) = xy−1n =
x(y−1)+(x−1)
n = x
(y−1)
n +
(x−1)
n =
xLi(y) + Li(x) [n]. Since x = 1 [n], Li(xy) = Li(x) + Li(y) [n].
Let λ = kp(p
2 + p + 1) and 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Since NK/IQ(αi) = α
p2+p+1
i [p], α
λ
i =
(NK/IQ(αi))
kp = 1 [p] (resp. modulo q). It follows that αλi = 1 [n], α
λ
i ∈ Γ
i
1 and
Li(αkλi ) = kL
i(αλi ) [n]. Therefore, skλ(a, b) − 3 = (α
kλ
1 − 1) + (α
kλ
2 − 1) + (α
kλ
3 −
1) [n], L(sk(a, b), s−k(a, b)) =
skλ(a,b)−3
n =
∑3
i=1 L
i(αkλi ) = k
∑3
i=1 L
i(αλi ) [n] and
L(a, b) = sλ(a,b)−3n =
∑3
i=1 L
i(αλi ) [n]. As L(a, b) is invertible modulo n,
L(sk(a,b))
L(a,b) =
k [n].
2.1. The deterministic version. Algorithm of encryption and decryption
in Scheme 3 of [4]
(1) Public parameters: (n, a, b)
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(2) Private parameters: (p, q)
(3) Encryption: For a message 0 ≤ m < n, Bob calculates the ciphertext block
C = (c1, c2) such that c1 = sm(a, b), c2 = s−m(a, b) [n
2].
(4) Decryption: For a given ciphertext block c, Alice can decrypt it by calcu-
lating L(c1,c2)L(a,b) [n].
Indeed, since c = (c1, c2) is a ciphertext, let 0 ≤ m < n such that c1 = sm(a, b)
and c2 = s−m(a, b). Then sλ(c1, c2) = sλ(sm(a, b), s−m(a, b)) = smλ(a, b) = 3
modulo n. Thus, L(c1, c2) is well defined and
L(c1,c2)
L(a,b) =
L(sm(a,b)
L(a,b) = m [n].
2.2. The probabilistic version. Algorithm of encryption and decryption
in Scheme 3 of [4]
(1) Public parameters: (n, a, b)
(2) Private parameters: (p, q)
(3) Encryption: For a message 0 ≤ m < n, Bob selects a random integer r and
calculates the ciphertext block C = (c1, c2) such that c1 = srn+m(a, b), c2 =
s
−(rn+m)(a, b) [n
2].
(4) Decryption: For a given ciphertext block c, Alice can decrypt it by calcu-
lating L(c1,c2)L(a,b) [n].
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